By Daled Amos
This interview was done before Israel's response to Iran's attack this morning. It outlines an approach that in fact appears to be the one adopted by Israel in Syria and Iran.
"Israel continuing undeterred to attack Iranian interests as before, would frustrate the Iranian attempt to stop Israeli action against Iran and their proxies"
Irwin Mansdorf, Ph.D., fellow at the Jerusalem Center of Public Affairs specializing in political psychology
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| Dr. Irwin J. Mansdorf |
In your recent article, To Respond or Not to Respond: Is That the Real Question? you discuss the issue of Israel's deterrence of Iran, in light of Iran's direct attack on Israel. From a psychological standpoint, what is the definition of deterrence? How is its success measured?
Deterrence is simply reducing the probability, frequency, or intensity of an action. For Iran, deterrence is directed at Israel’s actions against Iranian interests in Syria, Lebanon, and in Iran proper. For Israel, deterrence is targeted against Iranian aggression against Israel.
Israel has been attacking Iranian targets both in Syria and in Iran itself for years now. What do you think Israel's goal has been, and has it been successful?
Israeli actions in Syria differ from Israeli actions in Iran. Most of the activity in Syria was directed against arming Iranian proxies who fight Israel. Action on Iranian soil was directed largely at thwarting Iranian nuclear ambitions. Measuring success is relative, and since the motivation for attacking Israel and developing nuclear capability still exists, we can only talk about suppressing behavior as opposed to eliminating it.
As a psychological tool, does Israeli deterrence rely only on the 2 opposing parties, or is there a message there for Israel's "allies" in the West and the Gulf as well?
To the degree that Israeli interests align with that of “allies,” the message is the same. But for each “ally”, there are domestic considerations, and those considerations can determine how far any country will go in their cooperation with Israel or the United States against Iran.
You indicated in your article that the debate of whether Israel needs to retaliate has overlooked Iran's purpose in launching their barrage of drones and missiles. What was Iran's intent? How does that goal affect Israel's calculation of whether to retaliate immediately? What do you think Israel should do?
The immediate goal of Iran was to “punish” Israel for the strike that killed several top IRG commanders. This was a public humiliation for the Iranian regime that they apparently felt they needed to respond to. By launching such a massive response, they hoped for success, which would be a reduction in Israeli activity against Iran. However, Iran’s ultimate intent is to destroy Israel. That has been made clear time and time again. I don’t think there was an expectation that the drone and missile attack would destroy Israel, but it certainly was a test of their weaponry and an exercise that was aimed at convincing Israel to restrain attacks against Iranian interests.
Since Iran’s goal was to reduce Israeli military and covert operations against Iranian interests, Israel needs to continue according to a plan that demonstrates that the Iranian attack did not achieve that goal.
You write:
Considering the success of Israel in its defensive stance, any future Iranian actions in response to Israeli initiatives should be viewed as a failure in Iran’s stated goal of deterrence, viz. Israel
Can you elaborate?
I don’t think that Iran expected that their drone and missile attack would fail to produce more damage than it did. That reduced the deterrent effect of their action. Considering the scale of their attack, they would be risking an even greater loss of deterrence should a subsequent attack produce similarly limited results.
Business as usual -- Israel continuing undeterred to attack Iranian interests as before -- would frustrate the Iranian attempt to stop Israeli action against Iran and their proxies. While a larger-scale "show" attack would certainly make waves, we need to keep in mind that Iran's purpose in their attack was to stop the current Israeli policy, and an approach that counters those goals would appear to be most effective, and, given the international support at the moment, the most functional and practical for Israel to take.
A modern, strong, peaceful Iran could become a pillar of stability and progress in the region. This cannot happen unless Iran's leaders decide whether they are representing a cause or a nation — whether their basic motivation is crusading or international cooperation. The goal of the diplomacy of the Six should be to oblige Iran to confront this choice.
Hamas sees itself more as a cause than as a nation, claiming that the defense of Gazans falls to the UN and Israel. Would that explain in part why deterrence has not worked?
Absolutely. Hamas is an abbreviation for the “Islamic” resistance movement, and “Palestine” is not even part of their name. Their motivation may include nationalistic goals, but their primary purpose is a religious one—and that sort of ideology is much more resistant to change
“Deterrence” is temporary. Within Islamist philosophy, temporary breaks in fighting are acceptable so long as the goal of ultimate victory can be resumed at a later stage. The religious ideology of Iran’s leadership will not be deterred, in the conventional sense, from moving towards their ultimate goal. While they may make temporary concessions that, to Western eyes, may appear to be steps toward accommodation, this is only a “break in action” until the circumstances and conditions are ripe for them to take the next step toward their goals. Iran may seem to accept “moderation” as a temporary and functional step, but their ideology will always keep its goals against Israel and the United States on “standby” until they are able to take action.
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