Die Welt has put together
a pretty good case that Turkey is seeking to build nuclear weapons.
That Turkey is obviously working on nuclear weapons is hardly discussed publicly. The western intelligence scene, however, is largely in agreement about it.
The model for the strategy of the Turks is clearly Iran. Tehran seeks nuclear weapons by creating bomb material in secret under the cover of a civilian nuclear program. And Turkey has launched a large-scale civilian nuclear program in recent years. The official reason for this: The domestic economy is growing and needs more power.
In 2011 they contracted the Russian company Rosatom Ankara for 15 billion euros to build a large reactor complex on the Mediterranean coast, about 300 kilometers east of the tourist center of Antalya. Two years later, a similar agreement with a Japanese-French consortium for the price of 17 billion. Even more interesting than these figures are the contracts - and especially what is not in them.
When companies build a light-water reactor, they usually agree with the Government that the project will operate for 60 years and they will provide the necessary uranium for the operations and then take back the spent fuel. This was offered in the case of Turkey by both Rosatom and the Japanese-French consortium. So far nothing special.
But Turkey has waived in both cases to fix the supply of uranium and the disposal of spent fuel from the contract. She insisted on the contrary, to regulate this separately later. Ankara explains that this is not an unusual maneuver in the negotiations. But the intention behind it is easy to see: The Turkish leadership wants to keep these parts of the nuclear program in their own hands - and they are crucial to any State that wants to develop nuclear weapons.
First, there are the fuel rods: All over the world, the disposal of nuclear waste is discussed as a problem. Turkey on the other hand does not want to give up their spent fuel. The only logical explanation for this: they want to make preparations for the construction of a plutonium bomb.
And this is a civilian nuclear power plant so after burning off the bars they contain only 90 percent of waste, but in addition nine percent is permanently contaminated with uranium and plutonium. A plant that can isolate the plutonium from the highly radioactive material from the rods can be built within half a year and is about the size of a normal office complex. This has been shown in the United States system studies.
The fuel rods could theoretically be processed for reuse in a civilian reactor. But this is much more expensive than buying new. If Turkey still wants to keep the spent fuel rods, then there's just one reasonable explanation: She wants to gather material for a plutonium bomb.
The gaps in the contracts open yet another way to the bomb, namely directly with uranium. For Ankara uses the same technology that is also used to make the ore for a civilian reactor fuel available: uranium enrichment.
For the power plant operation, it must be enriched to 3.5 to five per cent, for nuclear weapons on at least 80 percent. The technical process is the same in principle. And so, it is a suitable cover for those who want to say that they are using it for power to in truth produce nuclear weapons.
According to the Federal Intelligence Service..., the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has already arranged in 2010 to secretly prepare for the construction of facilities for urainum enrichment. According to other intelligence findings Turkey already has a significant number of centrifuges. Where they come from, can be guessed, after all: Pakistan.
The Turks had a leading role in the activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear smuggler who provided 1987-2002 Iran, North Korea and Libya with thousands of centrifuges. The electronics of all Pakistani assets came from Turkish partners. Khan temporarily had even the intention to relocate its entire illegal centrifuge production in Turkey. 1998 offered the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif the Turks even a "nuclear partnership" in research.
Turkey had finally been helped in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 80s. At that time many components, which could not be procured openly, were delivered via Turkey to Pakistan. Therefore it is not surprising that intelligence reports to date say there is brisk nuclear scientific exchange between the two countries.
But probably it's about more than this. AQ Khan has proven to give his customers not only the centrifuges, but also with complete blueprints for the construction of nuclear weapons [like he did with Iran, Libya and North Korea.]
Another important indication in the chain is the Turkish missile program.....
Tthere is the question of the meaning and purpose of such accelerated missile development. The answer is relatively simple: medium-range missiles are suitable, due to their low accuracy and payload, only for weapons of mass destruction. A program for their preparation is a strong - a very strong - indication of an ongoing nuclear weapons program.
But why exactly does the political leadership of Turkey want the nuclear option? Again, you have to know to read hints and omissions. In August 2011, the Turkish ambassador to the United States, Namik Tan, said: "We can not let Iran have nuclear weapons." Two years later, the then Turkish President Abdullah Gul clarified this position in an interview with the magazine "Foreign Affairs": "Turkey will not allow a neighboring country to have weapons which Turkey does not have."
...
Given the already established nuclear power of Israel and the nascent nuclear-armed Iran, the Turkish prime minister has no choice but to arm his country with nuclear weapons as well, if he wants to carry out his vision of building a great Turkish power. Because otherwise, Turkey remains to his understanding of secondary importance - and therefore Erdogan cannot and will definitely not be satisfied.
The author Hans Rühle was from 1982 to 1988 the Head of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of Defense.
(h/t Gastwirt)
