Seth Mandel: Biden, Obama, and the Truth About ‘Daylight’
In July 2009, Obama met with American Jewish leaders at the White House. He offered some revisionist history of the George W. Bush administration’s work in the Middle East:The Postmodern Military
“Look at the past eight years. During those eight years, there was no space between us and Israel, and what did we get from that? When there is no daylight, Israel just sits on the sidelines, and that erodes our credibility with the Arab states.”
The absurdity of this statement made it an instant news story at the time. During the Bush administration, and with the Bush administration’s encouragement, Israel quite famously ended its occupation of Gaza in its entirety, and—this part might not have happened without the Bush administration’s involvement—disengaged from parts of the West Bank, too. In concert with the Bush administration, Israel gave the Palestinians their largest onetime grant of sovereignty in the history of the conflict.
In other words, Bush was both unambiguously supportive of Israel and successful at achieving breakthroughs in the conflict that benefited the Palestinians. Obama, meanwhile, went on to have the least success of any president in the Middle East since JFK. That was no coincidence.
What Bush understood was that only a policy of “no daylight” could have brought about the full extent of Ariel Sharon’s disengagement—specifically, the part including the West Bank. What Obama didn’t understand was that his own subsequent policy of daylight paralyzed the conflict, because Israel did make concessions but the Palestinians dug in their heels, preventing those concessions from turning into progress.
The truth is that it’s not difficult to get Israel to make concessions, but only under certain conditions is it even possible to move the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Donald Trump came into office and reversed Obama’s daylight policy, and by the end of his term Israel and Arab states had signed historic recognition deals.
Whether there is daylight or no daylight, Israel will make moves for peace—because it wants peace. But only when there is no daylight will the Arab world make reciprocal moves.
This was Blinken’s point. Every time there was daylight between the U.S. and Israel, Hamas backed off from agreeing to a cease-fire and releasing hostages.
Putting daylight between the U.S. and Israel is satisfying to anti-Israel media activists. But it does nothing for the Palestinians, nothing for peace, and nothing for America.
I have tried to highlight what I believe are the main milestones in the West’s and Israel’s military decline, about which much more can, and should be, said. Ben-Gurion’s critical and cautious approach to national security, particularly its military aspects, is long gone—along with conventional war doctrines and a strong operational army.Officer, lawmaker, now author: MK Tur-Paz publishes his war diary
It might be argued that Israel is winning against Hamas and Hizballah, and thing aren’t so bad as I claim. After all, since October 7, the IDF has waged wars against both terror organizations as well as their masters in Tehran, and appears successful.
I do not share this view. Yes, Israel has, over the last months, achieved much, and the IDF had many tactical successes. Yet the appearance of overall, strategic success is misleading for three primary reasons.
First, on Mida, the website I founded in 2012, Akiva Bigman—a researcher, investigative journalist, and Ph.D. student in military affairs—has compiled the most thorough operational and doctrinal report to date on the IDF’s ongoing campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon. The findings are devastating: lack of preparation, poor planning, severe shortages even in basic fighting equipment, dysfunctional battle processes, failures in command, operational incompetence, and lack of a comprehensive strategy have plagued the war from its outset. The IDF’s successes are mostly not due to operational competence but rather to the fighting spirit of the Israeli soldiers on the ground and the massive asymmetry between the IDF and its sub-military opponents, Hamas and Hizballah.
Second, let us examine the situation strategically. Fifteen months into the war, 30 percent of the Gaza Strip—a small territory of merely 140 square miles—has never been entered by the IDF. An additional 40 percent remains free of an IDF presence, because Israeli forces continue a cycle of raiding and withdrawing. Although its military capabilities have been diminished and part of its leadership eliminated, Hamas still retains control over most of Gaza and over its entire population. This situation is not dissimilar to Lebanon, where tactical successes ultimately resulted, under American pressure, in a ceasefire agreement that ensured Hizballah’s survival and subsequent rehabilitation.
Third, when we do what the Israeli security establishment hates to do—factor costs into the equation—we must conclude that, relative to the national investment in the war, it has been incredibly inefficient, especially when one considers that war with these two terror organizations was precisely what the IDF was supposed to prepare for with its $20 billion annual budget. Yet, instead of building a war machine capable of quickly deciding the conflict, Israel has had to allocate massive additional funds—which result in a massive, long-term national debt—and fifteen months later, the situation remains unresolved.
In short, the tactical victories—expected in asymmetrical wars—have not amounted to a strategic achievement. This is a case of underperformance on an alarming scale, with huge costs not only in treasure but in blood. With such massive inputs and limited outputs, the IDF of the 1950s to the 1980s would hang its head in shame. The lack of strategic thinking and competence in operational art led, as is often the case, to attritional raids. While these raids may be tactically impressive, they fail to deliver a lasting strategic impact.
This is why Israel must return to a classical military mindset. The next war might not be as asymmetrical as the conflicts against Hamas and Hizballah. Such a war would require a fundamentally different army and a restored operational art—not the weakened IDF and degenerated command currently in place. And if another asymmetrical war arises, that reformed army would still be capable of fighting it. The reverse, unfortunately, is not true.
Israel must urgently rebuild its security forces. Since an army is only as good as its command, the first priority must be reforming the intellectual military education of our officer corps. Our generals should be educated in military affairs, so they are not swayed by every new fantasy imported from the complacent West. Additionally, we must implement sweeping changes to the personnel, structure, and processes of the security establishment—from the IDF to the ministry of defense—to make it more efficient and war-ready.
Even if one estimates that the chances of war are low, its potential impact is existential, making the risk very high. Moreover, there is always a significant possibility that such optimistic estimations are incorrect. Lastly, nothing deters enemies more effectively than preparedness for war. These fundamental truths have been forgotten in Israel. The rising generation has performed brilliantly on the field of battle, but as they rise to responsibility for planning for future wars, they must bear the onus of reclaiming these principles and use them as the foundation for a comprehensive overhaul of our security establishment.
Yesh Atid MK Moshe “Kinley” Tur-Paz was a typical opposition lawmaker for most of 2023. A backbencher who does not favor stunts and shouting matches, he perhaps stood out most for his kippah and residence in Kfar Etzion, a West Bank settlement, despite representing a party that, by reputation and voting statistics, generally represents secular residents of central Israel.
Yet, like so many other Israelis, Tur-Paz took on new responsibilities in the wake of the Oct. 7 terror attacks and ensuing war with Hamas, becoming, as the title of his book suggests, An MK on the Night Shift. During the day, Tur-Paz was chief of operations for the IDF’s Gaza Division. His book, released in September, is subtitled “A War Diary,” and tells the story of the 85 days he spent on IDF reserve duty in Gaza.
Though Tur-Paz was born in the U.S., MK on the Night Shift is only available in Hebrew.
Tur-Paz, 52, was born in Philadelphia, where his parents, British immigrants to Israel, were serving as Jewish Agency emissaries. He spent years of his childhood in the U.K., where his parents served once again as emissaries. His uncle was Yehuda Avner, the renowned diplomat and advisor to four Israeli prime ministers.
Tur-Paz has a resume made up of elite liberal-leaning Religious Zionist educational institutions: He studied at a high school established by Rabbi Shlomo Riskin, and then Har Etzion Yeshiva, known informally as the “Gush.” He led Ne’emanei Torah Va’Avodah, a leading liberal Religious Zionist organization, was principal of the religious feminist high school Pelech in Jerusalem and was CEO of the Religious Kibbutz Movement’s chain of schools before entering electoral politics.
Throughout that time, he made his way up the IDF ranks as a reservist, going from a battalion commander in the Paratroopers Brigade to a lieutenant colonel, and chief of operations for the IDF’s Gaza Division during 2014’s Operation Protective Edge. His reserve duty, and that of other lawmakers, ended in July 2022 when the military no longer allowed Knesset members from serving in its ranks.
On the morning of Oct. 7, 2023, Tur-Paz was home with his children in Kfar Etzion, a religious kibbutz and settlement south of Jerusalem, when he received an emergency notice from the town’s security officer for residents keep their phones on and that anyone with a weapon should take it to synagogue. He attended that day’s Simchat Torah services, which were disrupted by a rocket siren, sending his family and their neighbors into bomb shelters.
That evening, Tur-Paz’s son, a career IDF officer, called him and said he thought the army needed someone with his experience in Gaza.
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